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ABSTRACT 
 Sentencing in the post-Booker world presents a variety of 
challenges and uncertainties for the courts, Congress, and the general 
public. This Note examines one such challenge, considering the 
difficulties surrounding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) in 
light of Booker. The Note develops the history of both Rule 32(h) and 
the Booker decision, analyzes changes and suggested amendments to 
Rule 32(h), and concludes that the conflict between Rule 32(h) and 
Booker can be easily resolved with slight alterations to the language 
of Rule 32(h). 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,1 which 
rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, heralded 
confusing changes in the federal sentencing system. As Justice 
Antonin Scalia anticipated, Booker gave rise to “a discordant 
symphony of different standards, varying from court to court and 
judge to judge.”2 Substantively, Booker starkly diverged from the 
sentencing regime previously established by Congress.3 Procedurally, 
Booker complicated the sentencing system by failing to give lower 
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 1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3. Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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courts any idea of how much deference they should give the 
Guidelines and by failing to provide certain safety nets for 
defendants.4 According to Justice Scalia, the majority’s approach was 
“rather like deleting the ingredients portion of a recipe and telling the 
cook to proceed with the preparation portion.”5 
Although the Booker decision did not produce the mayhem and 
colossal disorder that many commentators predicted,6 the Court 
nevertheless failed to establish a clear remedial sentencing system. 
Lower courts struggle not only to properly balance numerous 
requisite sentencing factors7 but also with the judicial discretion 
Booker reintroduced. As a result of the courts’ expanded interpretive 
leeway, circuit splits abound on post-Booker issues,8 and Booker itself 
fails to articulate clear standards to resolve those issues.9 “[A] set of 
overly complex and rigid rules . . . rendered advisory by a great 
judicial shock,” the sentencing system now uncertainly depends on 
trial judges’ adherence to the term “advisory” and subsequent 
appellate court policing.10 Such post-Booker confusion requires 
judges, legal scholars, and Congress alike to hone the sentencing 
system to meet the critical standards of constitutionality, clarity, and 
consistency.11 This refinement of federal sentencing requires 
deciphering and resolving the ambiguities of the Booker decision. 
 
 4. Id. at 300–01. 
 5. Id. at 307 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 6. Hyperbole is common in descriptions of the Sentencing Guidelines and the impact of 
the Booker decision. E.g., Kris Axtman, Cases Test New Flexibility of Sentencing Guidelines, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 18, 2005, at 2 (“[F]iguring out what to do with all the cases that 
have been sentenced under the old guidelines is the closest thing to chaos you can describe.” 
(quoting Professor Douglas Berman of the Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law)); Dan 
Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Tough Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2005, at A2 (quoting Attorney 
General John Ashcroft describing the Booker opinion as “a retreat from justice that may put 
the public’s safety in jeopardy”); Myron H. Thompson, Op-Ed., Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A23 (advocating increased judicial discretion by analogizing the strict 
sentencing guidelines to the extreme punishments imposed by the Athenian leader Draco). 
 7. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65 (summarizing the role of the Guidelines and other 
statutory factors during sentencing). 
 8. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2459 (2007) (considering the circuit split involving 
the presumption of reasonableness of the Guidelines); United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the legality of different Guidelines versions and concluding that 
changes are not ex post facto laws). 
 9. David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The Impact of Appellate Review on 
Defendants’ Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 (2006). 
 10. Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2005). 
 11. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 
194 (2005) (“By encouraging meaningful appellate review and deploying other devices . . . to 
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One point of discord arising from Booker involves Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Rule 32(h), entitled “Notice of Possible 
Departure from Sentencing Guidelines,” provides: 
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range 
on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence 
report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the 
parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure. 
The notice must specify any ground on which the court is contem-
plating a departure.12 
Rule 32(h) requires a court to provide fair notice to parties when 
considering a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.13 The 
Booker Court’s decision to make the Guidelines advisory, however, 
seemingly renders Rule 32(h) valueless.14 Why would a defendant 
need notice of a departure from Guidelines that are only advisory and 
not mandatory in nature? Should a defendant really expect a sentence 
to fall within the purely advisory Guidelines? In practice, courts’ 
answers to these questions have been anything but consistent. 
Rule 32(h) provides an ideal lens through which to view some of 
the dilemmas in the post-Booker world of sentencing. The very 
existence of Rule 32(h), after Booker, has caused a circuit split15 with 
further uncertainty surrounding the appropriate amount and timing 
of notice that must be provided to parties under Rule 32(h). 
Consequently, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure has drafted a new version of Rule 32(h), 
conforming to the Booker requirements.16 Under the heading of 
 
promote a richer sentencing discourse, Congress can continue to move the federal sentencing 
system forward.”). 
 12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h). 
 13. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991) (holding that a district court may 
not upwardly depart from the Sentencing Guidelines range without first notifying the parties of 
its intent to depart). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 424 (2006) (“Application of the advance notice requirement of Rule 32(h) to 
discretionary sentenc[ing] would elevate the advisory sentencing range to a position of 
importance that it no longer can enjoy.”). 
 15. Compare id. at 197 (not requiring a notice requirement for variances from Guidelines 
sentences), with United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006) (keeping the 
notice requirement of Rule 32(h) even under an advisory Guidelines system). 
 16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Rules_Publication_August_2005.pdf#page=150. The Advisory 
Committee, composed of federal judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, state chief justices, 
and representatives of the Department of Justice, assists in coordinating and drafting 
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“Notice of Intent to Consider Other Sentencing Factors,” the 
Advisory Committee suggested: 
Before the court may rely on a ground not identified either in the 
presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court 
must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating 
either departing from the applicable guideline range or imposing a 
non-guideline sentence. The notice must specify any ground not 
earlier identified on which the court is contemplating a departure or 
a non-guideline sentence.17 
The proposed adjustments have progressed through various channels 
of the amendment process, so far yielding little actual procedural 
change. Nevertheless, the proposed amendments have generated 
additional considerations for Rule 32(h) and have illustrated the 
advantages of gradual, thoughtful fine-tuning of federal sentencing.18 
By integrating constitutionality, clarity, and reasonableness, 
proposed Rule 32(h) presents a rare accord within the convoluted 
world of post-Booker sentencing. Part I of this Note explores the 
emergence and current status of Rule 32(h) and Booker to 
appropriately contextualize the conflict between the rule of 
procedure and the rule of the Court. Part II then illuminates the 
apparent conflict between Rule 32(h) and Booker. This discussion 
sets the stage for Part III, which explains the value and legitimacy of 
proposed Rule 32(h) as a suitable compromise for courts, legislators, 
and the public. 
I.  ARRANGING RULE 32(H) AND BOOKER 
Viewing the background and confusion associated with Booker 
through the lens of Rule 32(h) helps elucidate the functioning of both 
Rule 32(h) and the Booker decision. Understanding the conflict 
between Rule 32(h) and Booker requires tracing the chronological 
development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Rule 32(h), and 
the Booker decision. 
 
appropriate amendments to rules and explanatory committee notes. For a more complete 
explanation of the federal rulemaking process, and to see exactly how the Advisory Committee 
fits into the scheme of rulemaking, see The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and 
Bar October 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). 
 17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Rules_Publication_August_2005.pdf#page=150. 
 18. See infra Part II.B (discussing the airing of appropriate issues pertaining to Rule 32(h)). 
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A. The Guidelines 
Prior to both Rule 32(h) and Booker, increasing crime rates in 
the 1970s and 1980s generated an alliance between conservatives and 
liberals, resulting in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 (SRA).19 The SRA created the Sentencing Commission, and 
Congress charged the Commission with three goals: (1) meeting the 
SRA’s sentencing purposes, (2) providing certainty and fairness in 
sentencing by avoiding unwarranted disparities among defendants 
with similar records, and (3) reflecting the advancement in the 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice 
process.20 The Sentencing Commission developed the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which prescribed more uniform sentencing ranges for 
similarly situated offenders.21 Using a grid of narrow sentencing 
ranges, the Guidelines coordinate an offense with offender 
characteristics to establish sentencing requirements and options.22 
Adopted in 1987, the Sentencing Guidelines represented “a 
watershed in legal history.”23 
B. The Emergence of Rule 32(h) 
Rule 32(h) emerged in response to the Supreme Court’s 1991 
decision in Burns v. United States.24 The Burns Court required prior 
notification to both parties if a court intended to upwardly depart 
from a range mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines.25 Though, at 
the time of the Burns decision, Rule 32 “contain[ed] no express 
language requiring a district court to notify the parties of its intent to 
make sua sponte departures from the Guidelines,”26 the Court 
nevertheless construed Rule 32 to require notice of any consideration 
of an upward departure from the mandatory Guidelines range.27 The 
 
 19. Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines after 
Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2006). 
 20. Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (construing the SRA). 
 21. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 526.1 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Bissonnette, supra note 19, at 1506. 
 24. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991). 
 25. Id. at 138–39. 
 26. Id. at 132. 
 27. Id. at 136–37. 
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Court based its decision on the need for “full adversary testing of the 
issues relevant to a Guidelines sentence.”28 Noting that “[n]ot every 
silence is pregnant,”29 the Court determined that “Congress did not 
intend district courts to depart from the Guidelines sua sponte 
without first affording notice to the parties.”30 Subsequently, Congress 
added Rule 32(h), entitled “Notice of Possible Departure from 
Sentencing Guidelines,” to codify the Court’s decision in Burns.31 
C. The United States v. Booker Segue 
In 2005, the Booker opinion addressed the constitutionality of 
the Sentencing Guidelines. Booker combined the cases of Freddie J. 
Booker and Ducan Fanfan to consider “whether an application of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.”32 A 
judicial finding that Booker obstructed justice increased his sentence 
for drug possession with intent to distribute from twenty-one years 
and ten months to thirty years.33 The judge in Fanfan’s drug 
possession case, on the other hand, refused to “make ‘any blanket 
decision about the federal guidelines.’”34 Instead, the judge based 
Fanfan’s sentence “solely upon the guilty verdict” in the case.35 
In unusual fashion, the Booker Court issued two seemingly 
disparate 5–4 opinions by two very different majorities.36 In the first 
Booker opinion (Booker I) Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and 
 
 28. Id. at 135. 
 29. Id. at 136 (quoting Ill., Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 
1983)). 
 30. Id. at 136. 
 31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) advisory committee’s note (indicating that Rule 32(h) reflected 
the Burns decision by requiring notice of the specific grounds of a Guidelines departure before 
a sentencing court could depart). 
 32. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 33. Id. at 227. 
 34. Id. at 229 (quoting Appendix A to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11a, Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (No. 04-105)). 
 35. Id. (quoting Appendix A to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11a, Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(No. 04-105)). 
 36. In the first majority opinion of Booker, Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, 
Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg comprised the majority. Id. at 226. The dissenters, 
however, from the first majority opinion embraced the second majority opinion. Justice Breyer, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Ginsburg all agreed 
with the second remedial majority. Id. at 244. Justice Ginsburg, the only justice in both 
majorities of Booker, did not write to explain her decision. 
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followed the Court’s budding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.37 The 
Court applied the Sixth Amendment to the sentencing enhancements 
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,38 holding that any sentencing 
enhancements based on facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt 
by a jury were unconstitutional.39 The Court stated that “[a]ny fact 
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established 
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant 
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”40 Booker I came as 
no great surprise in the legal world because it grew “directly out of a 
similar conclusion the same five justices . . . reached . . . in invalidating 
the sentencing guidelines system in the state of Washington.”41 
Writing for the majority in the second Booker opinion (Booker 
II), Justice Breyer attempted to remedy the constitutional flaws in the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Booker II rendered the Guidelines advisory 
rather than mandatory.42 The Booker II majority excised the 
mandatory portions of the Guidelines,43 required that the newly 
expurgated Guidelines be considered as a factor during sentencing,44 
and checked the newly fashioned judicial discretion in sentencing by 
placing a standard of reasonableness review on appellate courts.45 
More specifically, the Justices in Booker II concluded that Congress 
would have preferred removing the certain mandatory portions of the 
Guidelines that violated the Sixth Amendment instead of invalidating 
the entire Sentencing Guidelines Act.46 To comply with this prediction 
 
 37. Booker, 543 U.S. at 238, 243–44; cf. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) 
(considering the constitutionality of the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines and holding 
that “[o]ur commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding 
precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial. That right is no mere 
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.”); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (distinguishing sentencing facts from elements 
of the offense and holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 38. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229. 
 39. Id. at 244. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Transforms Use of Sentence Guidelines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1. 
 42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46. 
 43. Id. at 259. 
 44. Id. at 264. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 249. 
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of congressional will, the Court elected to “sever and excise two 
specific statutory provisions: the provision that requires sentencing 
courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines 
range . . . and the provision that sets forth standards of review on 
appeal.”47 The Court also selected a reasonableness standard of 
review for sentencing considerations at the appellate level, specifying 
that § 3553(a), which enumerates the factors that influence 
sentencing, serve as the guide for the appellate reasonableness 
standard.48 In what amounted to a “remarkable act of judicial 
jujitsu,”49 Justice Breyer, seeking to protect the essential pre-Booker 
aspects of sentencing, raised a firestorm of criticisms and questions.50 
As one commentator remarked, “the remedy,” Booker II, “was the 
surprise . . . that will shape the continuing debate over sentencing 
policy.”51 
D. The Current Tempo of Booker 
Booker prompted a variety of reactions from an abundance of 
sources. On the judicial front, Booker propelled the federal courts 
into uncertainty and transformed the federal sentencing process.52 
“U.S. judges across the country are struggling to navigate their 
newfound discretion amid thousands of appeals, widespread 
confusion and sharp scrutiny from critics who are on guard for soft 
punishments.”53 Many courts continue to adhere to Guidelines 
recommendations. For instance, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
 
 47. Id. at 259. 
 48. Id. at 261. The statute indicates: 
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence [include] . . . (1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) 
the need for the sentence imposed . . . ; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the 
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for[] (A) the applicable 
category of offense . . . ; (5) any pertinent policy statement . . . ; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any 
victims of the offense. 
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). 
 49. Charlie Savage, High Court Overturns Sentencing Guidelines but Ruling Will Allow 
Advisory Use by Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1 (quoting Professor Frank 
Bowman of the Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis). 
 50. See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 
43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 346 n.16 (2006) (“Many commentators have noted the apparent 
conceptual confusions in the Booker opinions.”). 
 51. Greenhouse, supra note 41. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Gail Gibson, Judges Left in Confusion on Sentencing, BALT. SUN, Feb. 13, 2005, at 1A. 
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Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all applied the presumption of 
reasonableness to sentences within Guidelines ranges, giving the 
Guidelines significant weight as sentencing factors.54 At the district 
court level, some judges also feel obliged to adhere to the Guidelines. 
A Nebraska district court judge resolved “that the Guidelines must be 
given substantial weight even though they are now advisory. To do 
otherwise is to thumb our judicial noses at Congress.”55 
On the other side of the coin, some courts hesitate to apply the 
presumption of reasonableness to the Guidelines. The Second Circuit, 
for instance, has expressly rejected the presumptive reasonableness of 
Guidelines sentences.56 District of Massachusetts Judge Nancy 
Gertner, likewise, embraced the judicial flexibility that Booker 
provided because she “[s]o many times . . . found [herself] in a 
situation where the guideline sentence made no sense in light of the 
facts.”57 
The Supreme Court has allowed but has not mandated the 
presumptive reasonableness approach to Guidelines sentences. In 
Rita v. United States,58 Victor Rita argued that although his sentence 
fell within the Guidelines range, it did not adequately account for his 
history and characteristics and did not comply with the sentencing 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).59 The Court, however, upheld the 
Fourth Circuit’s presumption of reasonableness, stating that “a court 
of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district 
court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”60 Relying on the nonbinding nature of the presumption 
and the congressional goals set forth by the Sentencing Guidelines 
Act, the Court held that the presumption of reasonableness reflects a 
proper balance between deference to the district court and to the 
Sentencing Commission.61 The Court also emphasized that “the 
 
 54. Bissonnette, supra note 19, at 1523. 
 55. United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (D. Neb. 2005). 
 56. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
192 (2006) (“We therefore decline to establish any presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, that a 
Guidelines sentence is reasonable.”). 
 57. Shelley Murphy, 2 Boston Jurists Hail Return of Discretion, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 
2005, at A20 (quoting Judge Nancy Gertner). 
 58. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 59. Id. at 2462. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 2465 (“[T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than 
having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the 
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presumption . . . is an appellate court presumption. . . . Thus, the 
sentencing court subjects the defendant’s sentence to thorough 
adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure.”62 
Although the Supreme Court’s support for the Fourth Circuit 
presumption of reasonableness for Guidelines sentencing in Rita 
offers some insight into the Court’s treatment of the Guidelines, 
considerable portions of the post-Booker sentencing regime still 
confound lower courts. Rita’s consideration of the presumption of 
reasonableness debate did not settle the judicial disagreements 
associated with the Court’s failure in Booker to describe precisely 
how trial courts should employ the Guidelines.63 
Looking beyond the judiciary, the Booker decision, by markedly 
changing the federal sentencing system, sparked sundry responses by 
legislators. Although some congressional leaders, shortly after the 
Booker decision, braced for a fight over how much discretion should 
be provided to federal judges,64 others advocated restraint from hasty 
legislative maneuvers that might further complicate an already 
opaque system.65 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen 
Specter commented that he intended “to thoroughly review the 
Supreme Court’s decision and work to establish a sentencing method 
that will be appropriately tough on career criminals, fair, and 
consistent with constitutional requirements.”66 Senator Ted Kennedy, 
however, warned against “rash action by Congress to impose a 
mandatory sentencing regime” to allow a federal sentencing 
commission time to recommend reforms.67 
Public responses to Booker also varied in substance and source. 
With the Department of Justice scrambling to preserve the remaining 
authority of the Guidelines, other legal scholars, criminal defense 
attorneys, and critics decried the confusion over the Guidelines and 
 
judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate 
application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is 
reasonable.”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 2475 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[P]recisely what ‘reasonableness’ review entails 
is not dictated by Booker. . . . The Court has reintroduced the constitutional defect that Booker 
purported to eliminate. . . . [W]e should have left in place the compulsory Guidelines that 
Congress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged scheme of our own.”); Bissonnette, 
supra note 19, at 1500. 
 64. Greenhouse, supra note 41. 
 65. Savage, supra note 49. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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Booker’s effects. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez called on 
judges to adhere to uniform sentences, stating, “More and more 
frequently, judges are exercising their discretion to impose sentences 
that depart from the carefully considered ranges developed by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission.”68 Jon Sands, chairman of the Federal 
Defender Guideline Committee, called the Booker opinion 
“bittersweet,”69 stating that “the Sixth Amendment was vindicated, 
but then it was undercut again, all in one day.”70 On the other hand, 
Harvard Law School Professor William Stuntz commented, “[I]n its 
own strange, two-part way, Booker gets us to a good result. It may 
lead us as close to an ideal system as we may ever get—rules 
moderated by mercy.”71 Sentencing expert, Professor Doug Berman 
conceded, though, that sorting through the post-Booker issues 
requires time and patience in the lower courts.72 
E. The Current Tempo of Rule 32(h) 
Following the Booker decision, questions concerning the 
potential abolishment or amendment of Rule 32(h) began to 
circulate. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the first channel in effecting changes to the Criminal 
Rules, considered the possible application of Rule 32(h) in light of 
Booker.73 The Advisory Committee utilized a subcommittee 
specifically designed to analyze the impact of Booker on the Criminal 
Rules,74 and “the Subcommittee . . . discussed whether it might be 
advisable to delete Rule 32(h) in its entirety but . . . ultimately 
decided to leave it in . . . .”75 The Advisory Committee adopted one 
 
 68. Alexis Grant, Attorney General Pushing for Harsher Sentences, HOUSTON CHRON., 
June 22, 2005, at A5. 
 69. Kristina Walter, Note, Booker and Our Brave New World: The Tension Among the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and a Defendant’s Constitutional Right to 
Trial by Jury, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 657, 673 (2005) (quoting Telephone Interview by Mary 
Price, Families Against Mandatory Minimum, with Jon Sands, Chairman, Fed. Defender 
Guideline Comm. (Jan. 12, 2005)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker’s Promise, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. 
L. REV. 521, 521 (quoting Robb London, Aftermath, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2005, at 6). 
 72. Axtman, supra note 6, at 2. 
 73. Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 5 (Apr. 4–5, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/rules/Minutes/CR04-2005-min.pdf; see supra note 16 (discussing the rulemaking process). 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Id. at 5. 
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amended version of Rule 32(h),76 which received public comments.77 
In April 2006, responding to concerns, the Committee slightly 
amended the language of its proposed draft, unanimously adopting 
more specific terminology suggested by the Sentencing Commission.78 
After this alteration, the proposed Rule 32(h), entitled “Notice of 
Intent to Consider Other Sentencing Factors,” stated: 
Before the court may rely on a ground not identified for departure 
or a non-guidelines sentence either in the presentence report or in a 
party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the parties 
reasonable notice that it is contemplating either departing from the 
applicable guideline range or imposing a non-guideline sentence. 
The notice must specify any ground not earlier identified for 
departing or imposing a non-guideline sentence on which the court is 
contemplating imposing such a sentence.79 
Despite the Advisory Committee’s April 2006 modification, the 
Standing Committee hesitated to approve the rule, given the “fluid” 
state of the developing caselaw.80 In June 2006, it sent the proposed 
amendment back to the Advisory Committee,81 which agreed by a 7–4 
vote at its October 2006 meeting to further consider Rule 32(h).82 The 
Advisory Committee identified four areas of focus for the 
 
 76. “[T]he Subcommittee had proposed two alternatives: The first version would make a 
distinction between ‘variances’ and ‘departures.’ The second version would make no 
distinction. . . . [T]he Committee decided to use the first alternative, with some minor changes, 
which included using the term ‘non-guideline sentence’ instead of the term ‘variance.’” Id. 
 77. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 CRIMINAL RULES COMMENTS CHART, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Rules%202005.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2007) (listing 
the public comments for all 2005 Criminal Rules and specifying those applying to Rule 32). 
 78. See Report from Susan C. Bucklew, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3–4 (May 20, 
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CR05-2006.pdf (detailing the adoption 
of the Sentencing Commission’s suggested language for Rule 32(h)). 
 79. Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 6 (Apr. 3–4, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/rules/Minutes/CR04-2006-min.pdf; Letter from Judith W. Sheon, Staff Dir., U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, to David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2–3 (Feb. 15, 2006) 
(emphasis in original to denote proposed changes to Rule 32(h)), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Comments%202005/05-CR-017.pdf. 
 80. Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, at 25–27 (June 22–23, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
Minutes/ST06-2006.pdf. 
 81. Id. at 26–27. 
 82. Report from Susan C. Bucklew, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2–3 (Dec. 18, 
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CR12-2006.pdf. 
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reexamination: (1) the relationship between the Guidelines and other 
sentencing factors, (2) the requirement of notice by due process, (3) 
the meaning of adequate notice, and (4) specific cases given attention 
by the Federal Defenders.83 Rule 32(h) has remained in a somewhat 
indeterminate state, subject to the multiplicity of steps and safeguards 
in the amendment process for the Criminal Rules. 
II.  DISSONANCE 
The inconsistencies between Rule 32(h) and Booker have 
spawned disagreement among the federal courts of appeals, the 
drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the public. 
Understanding this dissonance surrounding Rule 32(h) is vital to 
ascertaining its significance within the world of sentencing. 
A. The Courts Not in Tune 
The circuits have split on the post-Booker role of Rule 32(h). On 
one hand, the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have applied 
Rule 32(h) to all non-Guidelines sentences since Booker.84 On the 
other hand, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have determined 
that Rule 32(h) has no real effect in light of the Booker holding that 
rendered the Guidelines advisory.85 
Favoring the notice provided by Rule 32(h), the Fourth Circuit 
held, in United States v. Davenport,86 that “notice of an intent to 
depart or vary from the guidelines remains a critical part of 
sentencing post-Booker.”87 Sentenced to ten years imprisonment for 
fraudulently using a credit card, Davenport appealed his sentence as 
unreasonable.88 For a number of reasons, including the district court’s 
failure to provide notice of its contemplation of a sentence above the 
advisory guideline range, the appellate court vacated Davenport’s 
sentence.89 The Fourth Circuit clarified its position on Rule 32(h), 
stating: 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing the circuit split). 
 85. Id. 
 86. United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 87. Id. at 371. 
 88. Id. at 367. 
 89. Id. at 374. 
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The need for . . . notice is as clear now as before Booker. There is 
“essentially no limit on the number of potential factors that may 
warrant a departure” or a variance, and neither the defendant nor 
the Government “is in a position to guess when or on what grounds 
a district court might depart” or vary from the guidelines.90 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Evans-Martinez91 
that Criminal Rule 32(h) survived Booker.92 The court stated that 
“[t]he district court’s plain error in failing to provide notice of its 
intent to sentence above the Guideline range ‘seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation’ of the sentencing 
proceeding.”93 The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits have also 
demonstrated support for the post-Booker application of Rule 32(h).94 
Conversely, the Third Circuit, in considering Frederick Banks’s 
sentence for selling illegally copied versions of Microsoft software 
products, firmly concluded, “[T]he District Court . . . was not 
obligated to provide advance notice of its intent to vary from . . . [the] 
Guidelines sentencing range.”95 In United States v. Walker,96 the 
Seventh Circuit correspondingly held that “[t]he element of unfair 
surprise that underlay Burns and led to the creation of Rule 32(h) is 
no longer present.”97 Thus, the court refused to vacate the defendant’s 
district court sentence.98 Because the district court departed from 
 
 90. Id. at 371 (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136–37 (1991)). 
 91. United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 92. Id. at 1164. 
 93. Id. at 1167 (quoting United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 94. See United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[A]s this case illustrates, 
it is clearly the better practice—whether or not the legal requirement survives Booker—for the 
court to provide notice to defendants when relying on departure provisions in the advisory 
guidelines not previously identified . . . .”); United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“The existence of the calculated Guidelines range as the starting point for either type of 
sentence makes the Burns rationale as appropriate for a non-Guidelines sentence as for a 
departure.”); United States v. Dozier, 444 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We do not question 
the viability of Rule 32(h) and Burns after Booker.”). 
 95. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 424 (2006). 
 96. United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 314 (2006). 
 97. Id. at 1007–08. But see United States v. Sharp, 436 F.3d 730, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that “if the [presentence report] or the prosecutor’s recommendation does not identify 
the basis for the potential sentencing increase, then ‘the Judge must inform the defendant, a 
sufficient time in advance of sentencing (i.e. [sic] not during the actual sentencing), of the 
specific grounds that the court is considering relying on to increase the terms of confinement.’” 
(quoting United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 1994))). 
 98. Walker, 447 F.3d at 1007–08. 
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advisory Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit included Rule 32(h) in the 
extended sentencing discretion of Booker.99 The Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits reached comparable conclusions.100 
The amount of notice required by Rule 32(h) has fostered 
further disagreement. By refusing to answer questions regarding the 
amount and timing of notice, the Burns Court set the tone for 
uncertainty among the appellate courts on the subject.101 Most courts 
agree that information in the presentence report (PSR) or prehearing 
submission satisfies the notice requirement of existing Rule 32(h).102 
Doubt, however, may arise on the actual amount and timing of notice 
required when a court considers a sentence outside a calculated 
Guidelines range. Is informing a defendant at a sentencing hearing 
sufficient, or is prior notice required? If prior notice is required, how 
much prior notice is sufficient? The circuit courts have not issued any 
bright-line rules concerning the amount or timing of proper notice. 
Though some courts have pronounced certain information, like that 
contained in the PSR or prehearing submission, as satisfying 
requirements for appropriate timing and notice, by and large, the 
circuit courts do not venture beyond the precise situations presented. 
In fact, most circuits simply state a reasonableness standard, like that 
of the Fifth Circuit, which provides for “reasonable notice . . . on a 
ground not identified for departure in either the presentence report 
or in a party’s prehearing submission.”103 The Second Circuit also 
generally requires “prior notice . . . [that] will facilitate a defendant’s 
opportunity to contest the factual premises of the sentencing judge’s 
view.”104 The circuit courts primarily determine the reasonableness of 
 
 99. Id. at 1007. 
 100. United States v. Simmerer, 156 F. App’x 124, 128 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 1599 (2006) (“There is no precedent from this court or from the Supreme Court establishing 
that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 applies to a post-Booker upward variance.”); United States v. 
Egenberger, 424 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2005) (“This is not a case where the defendant was 
entitled to notice that the court, in its Sentencing Guidelines calculations, was contemplating an 
upward departure . . . .”). 
 101. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 139 (1991). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 44 n.14 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is clearly 
the better practice . . . for the court to provide notice to defendants when relying on departure 
provisions in the advisory guidelines not previously identified in the PSR or in a party’s pre-
hearing submission.”); United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We have 
consistently held that the notice requirement may be satisfied by information in the PSR.”). 
 103. Allison, 447 F.3d at 406. 
 104. United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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notice provided but do not illustrate specifics of sufficient notice and 
sufficient timing of notice. 
B. The Cadence of the Drafters and the Public 
Disagreement over Rule 32(h) has not ended with the courts. 
The Advisory Committee’s consideration of proposed Rule 32(h) 
introduced several matters for deliberation. Following the Advisory 
Committee’s proposal for a revised, post-Booker Rule 32(h), the 
Committee received various public comments regarding the 
predominance of the Guidelines; the use of certain terminology in the 
proposed rule; and potentially undesirable consequences from the 
proposed rule, like procedural complications and extra court costs.105 
Public opinion regarding the proposed rule principally has 
focused on the primacy of the Guidelines and the use of outdated 
terminology. For instance, Chief U.S. Probation Officer Tony 
Garoppolo wrote, “This proposal effectively gives primacy to the 
sentencing guidelines as a factor for the Court to consider in 
sentencing, but neither Section 3553(a) or Booker give the guidelines 
such primacy.”106 Even the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NACDL), which wholeheartedly supported the continued 
applicability of Rule 32(h) once it appropriately conformed with 
Booker, conceded, “[T]he proposed amendment simply substitutes 
new language that perpetuates the primacy of the guidelines . . . .”107 
Federal Public Defender Jon M. Sands, however, countered the 
concern over Guidelines primacy with a statement about the reality of 
sentencing, noting that “[o]f all of the statutory factors courts must 
now consider, only the guideline range has a number attached to it. 
Thus, whether treated as advisory or presumptive, the guidelines 
continue to be the single most determinative factor of a defendant’s 
sentence length.”108 The formulation of Criminal Rule 32(h) and 
 
 105. See supra note 77 (indicating the public comments). 
 106. Letter from Tony Garoppolo, Chief U.S. Prob. Officer, to Comm. on Rules of Practice 
& Procedure (Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Comments% 
202005/05-CR-002.pdf [hereinafter Garoppolo Letter]. 
 107. Letter from William J. Genego & Peter Goldberger, Co-Chairs, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers Comm. on Rules of Procedure, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Standing Comm. on 
Rules of Practice & Procedure 5 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
CR%20Comments%202005/05-CR-020.pdf [hereinafter NACDL Letter]. 
 108. Letter from Jon M. Sands, Fed. Pub. Defender, to Peter G. McGabe, Comm. on Rules 
of Practice & Procedure 1 (Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter 
Sands Letter]. 
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public comments surrounding it illustrate the ongoing debate over the 
primacy of the Guidelines. 
Drafting a post-Booker version of Rule 32(h) also has involved a 
difference of opinion over certain terminology. Some courts of 
appeals distinguish between the treatment of a departure and the 
treatment of a variance.109 To clarify the distinction, a departure is a 
sentence both outside of the Guidelines range and outside of the  
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. A variance is a sentence outside of the 
Guidelines range but within the discretion of the § 3553(a) factors and 
Booker. This distinction between departures and variances led the 
Advisory Committee to consider two possibilities in drafting 
proposed Rule 32(h), one including a lingual distinction and one 
abandoning the differentiation between variance and departure. The 
Committee adopted a distinction for the draft of Rule 32(h), using the 
terms “departure” and, in place of variance, “non-guideline 
sentence.”110 The Committee’s choice failed to please the public fully. 
Chief Probation Officer Garoppolo expressed concern over the 
outdated nature of the term “departure,”111 and the NACDL 
communicated dissatisfaction with “[r]eferences to a court’s engaging 
in the act of ‘departing’ and references to ‘the applicable guideline 
range’ and to a ‘non-guideline sentence.’”112 The NACDL felt that 
these references were unnecessary to conform Rule 32(h) to the 
requirements of Booker and that continued use of such terms 
impeded the transformation to post-Booker sentencing, which 
revolves around all factors of § 3553(a).113 
Finally, the proposed version of Rule 32(h) has aroused 
apprehensions regarding potential procedural complications and costs 
associated with unnecessary court time. Judge Stewart Dalzell 
pointed out that the proposed version of Rule 32(h) “assures that 
many, if not most, sentencing hearings will have to take place at least 
twice, with consequent costs to the parties, victims, and public who all 
 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 127 S. Ct. 424 (2006) (holding that a variance is not subject to a notice requirement, but 
“if a court is contemplating a departure, it should continue to give notice as it did before 
Booker”). 
 110. See supra Part I.E (detailing the Advisory Committee’s choices for Rule 32(h)). 
 111. Garoppolo Letter, supra note 106. 
 112. NACDL Letter, supra note 107, at 5. 
 113. Id.; see supra note 48 (listing the § 3553(a) factors for sentencing). 
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have a right to attend such important proceedings.”114 The judge 
noted that some considerations of § 3553(a), such as a defendant’s 
remorse, are not discernable until the sentencing hearing.115 Thus, 
notice of consideration of an outside-Guidelines sentence, which 
includes both departures and variances, based on these later matters 
could only take place at the sentencing hearing.116 Notice would then 
necessitate a subsequent hearing, complicating the court’s schedule.117 
Rule 32(h) must therefore be viewed amidst circuit court, 
Committee, and public disagreements. These discrepancies form the 
analytical foundation for consideration of Rule 32(h). 
III.  THE RIGHT HARMONY 
The process of criminal sentencing constantly evolves, influenced 
by a plethora of factors and contributors both inside and outside the 
courtroom.118 “Especially after United States v. Booker, sentencing is 
an art, not a science.”119 Contemplated as an art form, sentencing 
inexorably involves “a veritable parade of actors, including 
legislators, sentencing commissioners, police officers, prosecutors, 
juries, trial judges, appellate judges, and executive branch officials.”120 
The Supreme Court maintains that different branches of the 
government should “converse with each other on matters of vital 
common interest,”121 and Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Blakely v. 
Washington,122 applied this cooperation to the sentencing process, 
stating, “Constant, constructive discourse between our courts and our 
legislatures is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional 
design . . . . Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this 
collaborative process.”123 
 
 114. Letter from Judge Stewart Dalzell, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa., to Susan C. 
Bucklew, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 (Nov. 15, 2005), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Comments%202005/05-CR-006.pdf. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally Chanenson, supra note 11 (detailing the evolution of federal criminal 
sentencing). 
 119. United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 120. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 175. 
 121. Id. at 175–76 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)). 
 122. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 123. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 175 n.2 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
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The Court’s application of the Constitution to sentencing in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,124 Blakely, and Booker offers refreshing 
possibilities for reevaluating the sentencing system. In fact, these 
holdings “offer a rare opportunity for reassessing and recommitting 
to the good principles and bipartisan spirit that shaped the SRA. 
Congress can learn from years of experience and commentary on the 
Federal Guidelines system and from guidelines systems in many 
states . . . .”125 Ultimately, post-Booker sentencing changes largely rest 
in the hands of Congress. Justice Breyer even conceded, “Ours, of 
course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress’ court. The 
National Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the 
sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress 
judges best for the federal system of justice.”126 Nevertheless, cues 
from sources like the courts, the Advisory Committee, and the public 
remain important for any further congressional action in sentencing.127 
Mindful of § 3553(a)(2)’s four essential purposes of retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,128 these entities 
continually work to clarify details and set the stage for congressional 
action. 
With proposed Rule 32(h),129 the Advisory Committee has 
assisted congressional action in sentencing by elegantly crafting a rule 
that melds diametric post-Booker viewpoints into a workable 
solution. Proposed Rule 32(h) provides for uniformity consistent with 
the congressional desires underlying the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Moreover, proposed Rule 32(h) conforms to the constitutional 
requirements set forth in Booker and Burns, even affording 
additional Fifth Amendment due process protection. Finally, 
proposed Rule 32(h) affords clarity to the post-Booker confusion of 
sentencing and buttresses the idea of reasonableness presented in 
Booker II. In short, proposed Rule 32(h) is a pragmatic, guiding step 
for future congressional action. It finesses a rare and valuable post-
 
 124. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 125. Weisberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 2. 
 126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005). 
 127. It is worthwhile to note that “sentencing law and policy reflect the decisions of many 
actors . . . changes in rules, procedures, or decisions by one actor can have a hydraulic impact on 
other actors and . . . responses by those actors are not always predictable.” Weisberg & Miller, 
supra note 10, at 20–21. 
 128. See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (discussing these four penal 
goals). 
 129. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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Booker blend of congressional desires with constitutional mandates 
alongside clarity and reasonableness. 
A. Congressional and Constitutional Notes 
Reconciling the congressional desire for uniformity with the 
constitutional aspects of the Booker decision is difficult at best.130 The 
notice requirement of proposed Rule 32(h) nonetheless satisfies 
congressional desires for uniformity in sentencing, complies with 
constitutional mandates, and furthers fairness and due process. 
First, proposed Rule 32(h) bolsters the congressional goal of 
sentencing uniformity by better ensuring the fairness of a non-
Guidelines sentence or a sentence departing from the Guidelines. 
Both the majority and the dissenters in Booker II agreed that 
Congress intended to create uniformity in sentencing.131 By requiring 
notice for any sentence imposed outside of the Guidelines, regardless 
of whether it is characterized as a variance or departure, Rule 32(h) 
adds an extra check on the judicial discretion permitted by Booker. 
Rule 32(h) ensures that courts more fairly consider all sentencing 
factors of § 3553(a) in the adversarial process and that courts 
reasonably justify sentences outside of the Guidelines. Through these 
checks, Rule 32(h) promotes the congressional goal of uniformity. 
Second, proposed Rule 32(h) satisfies constitutional demands. 
As the Court has stated, “Where rights secured by the Constitution 
are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would 
abrogate them.”132 Thus, Rule 32(h) must comply not only with the 
demands of Booker but also with the prior demands of Burns. The 
constitutional debate surrounding Rule 32(h) primarily emerges from 
the incompatibility of Booker II with Burns. Though the Court 
shaped the Burns decision around mandatory Guidelines, Booker II 
implemented advisory Guidelines. Decided at different times under 
different sentencing systems, the Burns and Booker decisions are not 
entirely reconcilable. Nevertheless, discussing and formulating Rule 
 
 130. See Weisberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 8 (“Booker undermines the constitutional 
legitimacy of rigid, judicially determined Guidelines . . . .”); see also Bissonnette, supra note 19, 
at 1534 (“Indeed, it is difficult to craft a role for the Guidelines that embraces congressional 
intent while following Booker’s Sixth Amendment holding. Although it seems that the remedial 
majority aimed to carve out a niche between indeterminate sentencing and a mandatory 
Guidelines system, this middle ground, as one scholar has noted, may not actually exist.”). 
 131. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 749, 749 (2006). 
 132. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966). 
06__ROSNICK.DOC 11/1/2007  3:22:10 PM 
2007] SENTENCING 251 
32(h) requires respecting the policies and mandates of both Burns 
and Booker. 
The proposed version of Rule 32(h) complies with the 
precedents of Burns and Booker, adequately balancing the mandates 
of the two Supreme Court opinions. The current draft of Rule 32(h) 
eliminates the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines as 
directed by Booker. The subheading change from “Notice of Possible 
Departure from Sentencing Guidelines” to “Notice of Intent to 
Consider Other Sentencing Factors” synchronizes the rule to Booker 
by “removing the language that (now) incorrectly gives exclusive 
focus to the guidelines.”133 
Though the revised subheading admittedly might suggest the 
primacy of the Guidelines, the language simply reflects the reality of 
the sentencing system. All of the courts of appeals require a 
Guidelines calculation,134 and this calculation is the only § 3553(a) 
factor with a numerical value.135 Moreover, as of March 2006, the 
United States Sentencing Commission reported that 85.9 percent of 
post-Booker federal cases resulted in sentences within the Guidelines 
range or below the Guidelines range with government sponsorship; 
62.2 percent of those cases used sentences actually within the 
Guidelines range.136 More importantly, only 1.6 percent of federal 
cases after Booker applied sentences above the Guidelines range, 
meaning both upward departures and variances.137 “[T]he defendant, 
defense counsel, and the prosecutor rely first and foremost on the 
guidelines in making critical decisions, such as whether or not to 
plead guilty and if so, on what terms.”138 
This is especially true for the defendant. If courts generally 
sentence above the Guidelines range in less than 2 percent of cases, a 
sentence within or below the Guidelines range seems a particularly 
reasonable expectation on the part of the defendant and the 
defendant’s counsel. Because judges are required to calculate the 
 
 133. NACDL Letter, supra note 107, at 5. 
 134. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 179. 
 135. See Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1 (“Of all of the statutory factors courts must now 
consider, only the guideline range has a number attached to it.”). 
 136. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 46, 62 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker_ 
report/Booker_Report.pdf. 
 137. Id. The government sponsored an additional 23.7 percent of sentences below the 
Guidelines range. Id. 
 138. Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1. 
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Guidelines range and to consider the range calculated, components of 
the Guidelines remain highly influential.139 Although Booker does not 
specifically articulate the primacy of the Guidelines, Booker II 
requires justification for sentences diverging from the Guidelines.140 
An assumption of a Guidelines or lower sentence is thus rational, 
particularly for defendants. Proposed Rule 32(h) therefore complies 
with the Booker decision in the most practical manner. 
In addition to complying with Booker, proposed Rule 32(h) also 
incorporates the directives of the Burns decision. Burns remains good 
law, and, given that Rule 32(h) directly implements that decision, the 
fundamental aspects of Rule 32(h) must stay intact. Some courts of 
appeals argue that the advisory nature of the Guidelines 
automatically provides defendants notice of any sentence outside of 
the Guidelines so long as the factors considered are the same as those 
in § 3553(a),141 but these courts disregard the Burns holding and its 
important element of fairness. Of course, some tweaking of Rule 
32(h) is necessary in light of Booker, but only slight nuances and the 
suggestion of the mandatory nature of the Guidelines must be 
adjusted to bring Rule 32(h) into line with the Booker decision. 
The Burns holding, although decided when the Guidelines were 
mandatory, still established fundamental principles for sentencing, 
which should not be swept under the rug of Booker complications. 
Citing the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, the 
Burns Court stated, “When a reasonable dispute exists about any 
factor important to the sentencing determination, the court must 
ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity to present 
relevant information.”142 Even before the existence of Rule 32(h), the 
Court held that Rule 32 “provide[d] for focused, adversarial 
development of the factual and legal issues relevant to determining 
the appropriate Guidelines sentence.”143 In other words, Rule 32 
contained an implicit notice requirement under the mandatory 
Guidelines regime. The same concept of fair adversarial proceeding 
 
 139. Weisberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 18. 
 140. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 181. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 424 (2006) (“Because defendants are aware that district courts will consider the 
factors set forth in § 3553(a), we believe the element of ‘unfair surprise’ that Burns sought to 
eliminate is not present.”). 
 142. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 133 (1991) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (1990)) (emphasis omitted). 
 143. Id. at 134. 
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present under a mandatory Guidelines system is present under an 
advisory Guidelines system.144 The Second Circuit substantiated this 
notion in United States v. Anati,145 stating, “In Burns, the Supreme 
Court was concerned not only with unfair surprise, but with the 
facilitation, through notice, of adversarial testing of factual and legal 
considerations relevant to sentencing. Notice permits the parties to 
focus their attention on the considerations upon which the resulting 
sentence will rest.”146 Other circuits agree that the underlying 
principle of Burns, requiring notice of upward departures or 
variances, should remain in place.147 
Finally, proposed Rule 32(h) dispels any due process concerns 
regarding a defendant’s notice requirement at sentencing. This 
version of Rule 32(h) strengthens the often-neglected Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding the sentencing process.148 
Although some courts such as the Fourth Circuit consciously address 
due process at sentencing,149 other courts, including the Third, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, “tak[e] advantage of the Fifth 
Amendment void left by Booker to erode the few procedural 
protections defendants enjoy at sentencing.”150 
“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract 
words of the Due Process Clause but . . . at a minimum they require 
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be 
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
 
 144. See Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1 (urging the Rules Advisory Committee to 
propose an amendment to Rule 32(h) that “would require courts to give reasonable notice when 
contemplating a sentence outside the guideline range”). 
 145. United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 146. Id. at 237 (internal citation omitted). 
 147. See United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
without affording a defendant the right to comment on an upward departure, “a critical 
sentencing determination [could] go untested by the adversarial process” (quoting Burns, 501 
U.S. at 137)); United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[N]either the 
defendant nor the Government ‘is in a position to guess when or on what grounds a district 
court might depart’ or vary from the guidelines.” (quoting Burns, 501 U.S. at 136–37)). 
 148. The Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence lags behind its Sixth, and the lack of 
procedural protections for defendants at sentencing undercuts Sixth Amendment advances. In 
fact, the leading case concerning due process limits at sentencing is the 1949 decision in Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Anne E. Blanchard & Sarah G. Gannett, Fifth Amendment 
Protections at Sentencing: The Next Logical Step After Booker, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 258, 258 
(2006). 
 149. Davenport, 445 F.3d at 371. 
 150. Blanchard & Gannett, supra note 148, at 258. 
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nature of the case.”151 Notice and the opportunity to be heard may be 
implemented in a number of ways, and the requirements of due 
process demand interpretation by the courts.152 To clarify procedural 
due process, the Court propounded a balancing test in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.153 This three-part test analyzes the interest affected, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, 
and the government’s interest.154 
The dissenters in Burns applied the Mathews test to the upward 
Guidelines departure.155 As to the first step, the dissenters conceded 
that a defendant’s interest in receiving a sentence not higher than the 
upper limit of the Guidelines was clearly substantial.156 In analyzing 
the second part of the Mathews test, however, the dissenters 
concluded that “both the risk of error under the procedures already 
required and the probable value of a further notice requirement are 
sufficiently low that the current sentencing scheme passes 
constitutional muster.”157 
Booker complicated procedural protections, countering the 
argument of the Burns dissenters that existing processes satisfy 
protective due process requirements.158 First, the opportunity to 
address the court at the sentencing hearing is inadequate as a 
procedural protection if the defendant or the government has no way 
of knowing what issues to prepare.159 The Burns majority agreed, 
“‘Th[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is 
informed’ that a decision is contemplated.”160 The Court further 
 
 151. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1037 (2d ed. 2005) 
(providing an overview of procedural due process requirements). 
 152. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 1037. 
 153. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 154. Id. at 335 (“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”). 
 155. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 148–53 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 149. 
 157. Id. at 150. 
 158. Id. at 153–54. 
 159. Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1–2; see also United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 235–
36 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing the importance of fair, adversarial proceedings). 
 160. Burns, 501 U.S. at 136 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 314 (1950)). 
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stated, “At best, . . . parties will address possible sua sponte 
departures in a random and wasteful way by trying to anticipate and 
negate every conceivable ground on which the district court might 
choose to depart on its own initiative.”161 Second, the current standard 
of reasonableness for appellate review creates a quandary for 
appellate courts and provides further confusion.162 Justice Scalia, 
dissenting in Booker, disparaged the coherence of the reasonableness 
standard for appellate review, describing it as “positively Delphic.”163 
An uncertain standard, such as the reasonableness standard for 
appellate review of sentencing, provides little reassurance of 
adequate procedural due process. 
On the value of notice itself, the dissenters in Burns noted, 
“Because a defendant thus has no need for evidentiary litigation, he 
has no need for notice of judicial intentions in order to focus the 
presentation of evidence.”164 Given the broader spectrum of judicial 
discretion post-Booker and the constitutional demand that “parties 
have an adequate opportunity to present relevant information,”165 
notice plays an even more important role during the post-Booker 
sentencing process. Foreseeing every possible factor that a judge 
might consider under § 3553(a) is impossible,166 and providing some 
warning of elements that need preparation before advocacy seems 
reasonable. 
The third step of the Mathews test examines the government 
interest in having a notice requirement at sentencing.167 Here, it is 
worthwhile to emphasize that the notice requirement of Rule 32(h) 
covers both upward and downward departures or variances.168 
Particularly given the more frequent occurrence of below-Guidelines 
sentencing,169 the government might also appreciate a notice 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 303 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the standard of reasonableness for appellate review). 
 163. Id. at 311. 
 164. Burns, 501 U.S. at 152 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 133 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (1990)). 
 166. Id. at 136. 
 167. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343–47 (1976). 
 168. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (applying Rule 32(h) to both upward and 
downward departures and variances). 
 169. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 136, at 46–47 (providing statistics 
demonstrating more downward departures and variances than upward departures and 
variances). 
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requirement at sentencing so that it can adequately prepare 
arguments against a downward departure or variance. In United States 
v. Walker, the government conceded that “due process concerns may 
still require a district court to provide notice and opportunity to be 
heard on any contemplated departure or imposition of a non-
Guideline sentence.”170 Despite the government’s due process 
concerns and desire to withdraw its argument detailing the 
inapplicability of Rule 32(h) to post-Booker sentences outside of the 
Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit simply noted and dismissed the 
government position, refusing to change its view on Rule 32(h).171 
Similarly in United States v. Anati: 
[T]he Government indicated its agreement with Anati’s position 
that the District Court was required to give notice prior to imposing 
a non-Guidelines sentence. It further conceded that, in the 
circumstances of this case, “the failure to give such notice was not 
harmless and that therefore . . . the case should be remanded to the 
District Court for resentencing.”172 
The government understandably might support the presence of a 
notice requirement during sentencing, and any Mathews concern 
about government disagreement wanes. 
Though courts and scholars often tiptoe around directly 
employing the due process analysis to notice of a departure or non-
Guidelines sentence, applying the Mathews test demonstrates that 
such notice is a necessary and realistic component of due process at 
sentencing. Thus, notice under Rule 32(h) given at sentencing is an 
essential element of procedural due process. 
B. Clear Rhythms 
Proposed Rule 32(h) traverses beyond merely satisfying varying 
congressional and constitutional demands. The suggested rule also 
provides rare clarity to the sentencing process by requiring notice 
both for sentences departing from the Guidelines and for sentences 
varying from the Guidelines. The rule, taking into account the lower 
courts’ disagreements over terminology, incorporates both variances, 
 
 170. United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1007 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
314 (2006). 
 171. Id. 
 172. United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 236 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Letter from David 
C. James, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to Roseann B. MacKechnie (Apr. 12, 2006)). 
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or in the language of the rule itself, non-Guidelines sentences and 
departures from Guidelines ranges.173 In other words, the rule 
eliminates the possibility that a court will use a terminological 
distinction to avoid providing notice for sentences that use the  
§ 3553(a) factors but do not stay within the Guidelines range. 
Implementing the revised version of Rule 32(h) provides lower courts 
with clear, explicit directives that require providing notice to 
defendants at sentencing if a court considers any departure or 
variance. Further, the most recent version of the rule, proposed by 
the Sentencing Commission, narrows what constitutes notice by 
specifically requiring identification of information in the PSR or 
prehearing submission that could form the basis for a departure or 
variance from the Guidelines range.174 By abolishing confusing 
semantics and adding more specific requirements, the terminology in 
proposed Rule 32(h) generates additional clarity in the post-Booker 
world of sentencing. 
C. The Reasonable Melody 
In assessing appellate review of sentences under the new 
sentencing regime, Booker II instituted a reasonableness standard.175 
Though facing harsh criticism regarding the ambiguity surrounding 
reasonableness, Justice Breyer nonetheless concluded that the Court 
“must view fears of a ‘discordant symphony,’ ‘excessive disparities,’ 
and ‘havoc’ . . . with a comparative eye.”176 In fact, Breyer dubbed the 
reasonableness underscored in Booker II as practical and “not foreign 
to sentencing law.”177 Proposed Rule 32(h) provides a small 
illustration of exactly what Breyer meant by reasonableness in the 
context of sentencing. Proposed Rule 32(h) supports congressional 
intent, meets constitutional requirements, and adds clarity to 
sentencing. Most importantly, proposed Rule 32(h) is fair to 
defendants, the government, and courts alike. 
Consider the following cases. In the Northern District of Texas, a 
defendant pled guilty to illegal reentry following deportation.178 The 
 
 173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (illustrating the narrowed scope of Rule 
32(h)). 
 174. Letter from Judith W. Sheon, supra note 79, at 2. 
 175. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005). 
 176. Id. at 263 (quoting id. at 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 177. Id. at 262. 
 178. Sands Letter, supra note 108 (discussing an unpublished decision). 
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court calculated a Guidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-seven 
months. The PSR, however, indicated several prior convictions for 
driving while intoxicated and one dismissed charge for sexual assault 
of a minor.179 Lacking any mitigating or aggravating factors supporting 
a Guidelines departure, the judge imposed a sentence of 120 months 
without any notice of an upward consideration to the defendant.180 
The judge justified his decision by stating that the defendant would 
have been convicted of sexual assault of a minor if the minor had not 
moved back to Mexico. The PSR contained no specific information 
about the sexual assault, and the judge failed to say where he 
obtained his information. With no notice that such information would 
be introduced at sentencing, the defendant had no opportunity to 
contest the consideration of the sexual assault charge.181 Similarly, a 
court in Alabama sentenced a mentally retarded defendant to life in 
prison when the Guidelines range for the crime suggested only a 
period of years.182 The government introduced, without notice, a 
prison disciplinary report detailing an altercation between the 
defendant and a prison guard. The judge at sentencing subsequently 
based his decision to upwardly depart from the Guidelines on this 
report. Again, the defendant, with no notice that the report would be 
introduced at sentencing, had no opportunity to challenge the 
presentation or the validity of the report.183 
Although these cases may be rarities in the criminal justice 
system given the miniscule percentage of federal cases that result in 
above-Guidelines sentences post-Booker, they nevertheless intimate 
an undeniable sense of unfairness. The implementation of proposed 
Rule 32(h) and the added procedural protection of notice might have 
prevented these defendants from receiving exorbitant sentences 
based on unexpected information. At the very least, with Rule 32(h) 
steadfastly in place, these defendants would have had a full and fair 
opportunity to challenge the unanticipated information upon which 
their sentences were based. 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. (discussing an unpublished decision). 
 183. Id. 
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Some courts suggest that the notice requirement of proposed 
Rule 32(h) unnecessarily complicates the sentencing system.184 On the 
contrary, the notice requirement is very reasonable within the scheme 
of sentencing. Concerns like those of Judge Dalzell, which posit 
excessive procedural costs, exaggerate the effect that Rule 32(h) 
would have on courts.185 According to the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, upward departures or variances from the Guidelines 
occur in less than 2 percent of all sentences, and downward 
departures or variances not sponsored by the government comprise 
only around 12.5 percent of cases.186 These statistics might lead to the 
suggestion that 14.5 percent of cases would potentially require a 
continuance based on a requirement for outside-Guidelines notice at 
sentencing. In the context of Rule 32(h), however, these numbers 
acquire slightly different meanings. First, at least four circuits have 
already decisively implemented an outside-Guidelines notice 
requirement at sentencing,187 meaning Rule 32(h) would not affect the 
dockets of cases in these circuits. Second, many appellate courts 
currently have notice requirements for Guidelines departures, but not 
for Guidelines variances.188 A substantial proportion of the cases 
identified by the Sentencing Commission would not be affected by 
proposed Rule 32(h) and thus would not significantly affect the cost 
of current sentencing.189 In fact, disregarding sentences constituting 
actual departures from the Guidelines, only about 11.7 percent of 
sentences could possibly require a continuance.190 Considering the 
 
 184. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Dalzell’s criticisms of 
proposed Rule 32(h)). 
 185. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (same). 
 186. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (showing sentencing statistics). 
 187. See supra Part II.A (discussing the circuits supporting post-Booker Rule 32(h) notice). 
 188. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (clarifying the typical differentiation 
between a departure and a variance). 
 189. The Sentencing Commission percentages can be separated into departures and 
variances. Given that a number of the circuits suggest that notice at sentencing is fair for 
sentences using information outside of the § 3553(a) factors, only the statistics for variances 
might constitute any sort of real procedural complication for the judiciary. 
 190. Below-Guidelines departures not related to Booker or § 3553(a), and therefore 
considered departures, equal 2.2 percent of cases. Above-Guidelines departures not related to 
Booker or § 3553(a), and therefore also considered departures, equal 0.2 percent. The 
remaining statistics represent the variances and sentences outside of the Guidelines for 
unspecified reasons. Addition of these numbers yields approximately 10.3 percent for 
downward variances or unspecified sentences and 1.4 percent for upward variances or 
unspecified sentences; thus, approximately 11.7 percent of the total sentences are variances or 
unspecified. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 136, at 62. 
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post-Booker application of Rule 32(h) in a number of circuits and 
discounting the cases of Guidelines departures, even fewer cases 
might actually require additional procedural costs, hearings, or 
continuances. 
Moreover, slight inconveniences to the court pale in comparison 
to the meaningful principles of fairness and justice that Rule 32(h)’s 
notice requirement incorporates into sentencing. In Booker, Justice 
Stevens wrote, “[T]he interest in fairness and reliability protected by 
the right to a jury trial . . . has always outweighed the interest in 
concluding trials swiftly.”191 Similarly, the interests in fairness and 
reliability protected by reasonable notice at sentencing outweigh the 
court’s interest in greater efficiency for what probably amounts to 
much less than 11.7 percent of cases. The holding in Burns 
substantiates this notion.192 Fairness to a defendant and due process 
outweigh any concern over possible continuance or complication of 
the sentencing system for the courts. 
In the end, proposed Rule 32(h) is a perfectly reasonable 
implementation of increased fairness at sentencing. As such, it will 
help ensure the reasonableness of sentencing suggested by Justice 
Breyer in Booker II. 
CONCLUSION 
With Justice Scalia’s “discordant symphony” playing in the 
background, judges, legislators, and commentators have worked to 
refine the post-Booker world of sentencing. Creating an appropriate 
response to Booker requires thoughtfulness and patience,193 not 
“knee-jerk, quick-fix solutions.”194 In the meantime, the Booker Court 
“has fashioned a reasonable remedy that will allow courts to conduct 
business until Congress decides how to act.”195 While the sentencing 
system operates under Booker, the interim before congressional 
action allows the opportunity for extensive commentary and 
thoughtful approaches to sentencing. 
 
 191. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).  
 192. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137–38 (1991). 
 193. Walter, supra note 69, at 683. 
 194. Gibson, supra note 53 (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, George Washington University 
law professor). 
 195. Savage, supra note 49. 
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Although this Note does not reveal any perfect solution to the 
complications of sentencing, it does offer a workable solution to one 
of a myriad of post-Booker dilemmas. With any change to the 
composition of Congress or to the Supreme Court, the outcomes of 
congressional action or the resultant judicial checks on changes to the 
sentencing system are enigmatic. In accordance with Booker, 
proposed Rule 32(h) instills constitutional compliance, clarity, and a 
sense of reasonableness in sentencing. Given the seemingly 
incompatible Booker majorities, the divergent responses to the 
Booker opinion, and the confounded jurists and legislators 
approaching the Booker mandates, adopting proposed Rule 32(h) 
would bring an encouraging measure of harmony to the federal 
sentencing system. 
